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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 10-4000 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SHAWN STEWART, 
 
                                         Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-07-cr-00347-001) 
District Judge:  The Honorable John E. Jones, III 
__________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
(Filed: June 20, 2011) 
__________ 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 Appellant Shawn Stewart was arrested by Pennsylvania authorities and indicted by 
a federal grand jury on charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine 
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  Before trial, Stewart filed a motion to suppress 
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evidence obtained from his arrest, which the District Court denied.  Stewart‟s motion to 
dismiss the indictment for a violation of his Speedy Trial Act rights was likewise denied.  
Stewart then pleaded guilty to the charges, reserving the right to challenge the denial of 
his pre-trial motions on appeal. 
 The District Court sentenced Stewart to 130 months‟ imprisonment, as well as 
$100.00 special assessment and three years of supervised release.  Despite the reserved 
appellate challenge, Stewart‟s defense counsel failed to file an appeal. 
 Stewart filed a petition to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and asking for the reinstatement of his appellate 
rights and for a new sentence.  The District Court agreed.  Stewart‟s appellate rights were 
reinstated first.  Then, following additional briefing, the District Court concluded that 
Stewart should not have been classified as a “career offender” under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The District Court re-sentenced Stewart to time served.  He filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  Counsel filed an Anders brief and requested leave to withdraw.  Stewart 
was given the opportunity to file a brief pro se, but has not done so. 
II. 
 Upon the submission by counsel of an Anders brief, our inquiry is twofold.  First, 
we must consider “whether counsel adequately fulfilled [Third Circuit Local Appellate 
Rule 109.2‟s] requirements.”  United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Counsel must 
“satisfy the court that [he] has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable 
issues” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300 (citing United 
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States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)).  “Counsel need not raise and reject 
every possible claim.  However, at a minimum, he or she must meet the „conscientious 
examination‟ standard set forth in Anders.”  Id.  Second, we must conduct an independent 
review of the record and determine for ourselves whether there are any non-frivolous 
issues for appeal.  Coleman, 575 F.3d at 319.  If counsel‟s Anders brief is adequate, we 
confine our review to the issues presented in counsel‟s brief and any pro se brief 
submitted by the defendant.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 301.  However, even if counsel‟s 
brief is inadequate, we may still dismiss the appeal if it presents only patently frivolous 
issues.  See Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781. 
III. 
 We find counsel‟s brief adequate. When a defendant pleads guilty, as Stewart has 
done here, three potential issues remain available on appeal: the jurisdiction of the district 
court, the validity or voluntariness of the guilty plea, and the legality of the sentence.  See 
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  Counsel identifies each of these as 
potential grounds for relief, and after conducting a thorough review of the record, finds 
no issues of arguable merit for appeal.  We agree.  The first issue would clearly be 
frivolous because Stewart was charged with a federal crime; hence, the District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Moreover, as to the second issue, counsel 
demonstrated that he reviewed the record and the plea colloquy and found that any 
challenge to the validity or voluntariness of the plea would be frivolous.  While Stewart 
did allege in his § 2255 petition that defense counsel gave him poor advice by advising 
him to plead guilty,  his claim, without more, lacked sufficient specificity to be 
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meritorious.  Finally, inasmuch as Stewart received a sentence of “time served,” counsel 
correctly found there to be no appealable issue regarding his sentence.  We are satisfied 
that counsel conducted a “conscientious examination” of the record and that his brief is 
adequate.  Therefore, we will confine the remainder of our analysis to the issues raised by 
Stewart‟s reserved challenge to the District Court‟s pretrial rulings. 
IV. 
 Stewart moved to dismiss the indictment in the District Court contending that his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. 
Stewart first maintained he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial 
because, in a state court prosecution for related offenses, he had moved for dismissal 
based on a speedy trial violation and the Commonwealth had failed to respond.  
Collateral estoppel, Stewart argued, should have been applied to prohibit the related 
federal prosecution.  However, collateral estoppel only bars a later proceeding when the 
same issue was previously litigated by the same parties.  As the District Court here 
correctly explained, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States 
Government are not the same parties.  See United States v. Greco, 277 F.3d 339, 352 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Therefore, any challenge to the District Court‟s ruling on this point would be 
frivolous. 
 The record does reveal that Stewart‟s prosecution was delayed for approximately 
fourteen months.  The District Court recognized, and the Government conceded, that 
such a lengthy delay was “presumptively prejudicial.”  See, e.g., United States v. Dent,  
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149 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998).  The District Court employed the four-factor test 
governing constitutional speedy trial claims enunciated by the Supreme Court in Barker 
v. Wing, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) and ultimately denied Stewart‟s motion to dismiss the 
indictment.
1
  The District Court found it noteworthy that Stewart was not subjected to 
significant pretrial detention.  Moreover, the Government put forth as reasons for this 
delay the large size of its docket and the additional time given to Stewart to consider plea 
offers during his state prosecution.  The District Court found both Stewart and the 
Government equally responsible for the delay and that Stewart had appropriately asserted 
his rights.  However, as to prejudice, Stewart offered no evidence or argument on this 
point.  Therefore, it would be frivolous to argue on appeal that the District Court‟s ruling  
of no prejudice lacked merit. 
 Counsel‟s Anders brief further indicates that he reviewed the record and 
determined that any appeal challenging the District Court‟s denial of Stewart‟s 
suppression motion would be frivolous.  Counsel concluded that an appeal of the traffic 
stop would be frivolous.  A traffic stop is reasonable as long as “an officer possessed 
specific, articulable facts that an individual was violating a traffic law at the time of the 
stop.”  United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2006).  Stewart‟s 
vehicle had a broken headlight and this was sufficient justification for the traffic stop.  
While the vehicle was stopped, the officers observed in plain view drug paraphernalia 
which they lawfully seized with Stewart‟s consent.  Accordingly, we agree with counsel‟s 
                                              
1
 These factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether 
and how the defendant asserted his constitutional rights; and (4) the resultant prejudice. 
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
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Anders brief that there is no nonfrivolous issue relating to the District Court's denial of 
the motion to suppress. 
 Stewart‟s contention that an outstanding arrest warrant in the City of Harrisburg 
was based on a police officer‟s coercion of a witness to name Stewart as a participant in 
an armed robbery was determined to be baseless by the District Court.  After conducting 
a hearing on the issue, the District Court correctly determined that the evidence revealed 
no such coercion.  We agree, and find that any appeal on this issue would be frivolous. 
 Lastly, any challenge to the appropriateness of Stewart‟s transfer from his arrest 
location in one Pennsylvania county to another would be frivolous.  As recognized by the 
District Court and the Government here, the transfer did not comport with Pennsylvania 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 517.
2
  Stewart believes that this violation requires the 
suppression of evidence seized from his traffic stop.  However, Stewart presented no 
evidence that his transfer was constitutionally unreasonable and found no authority to 
support this contention.  Further, the District Court correctly determined that Stewart 
suffered no prejudice because, had the appropriate transfer procedure been followed, 
Stewart‟s person would have been searched and the evidence discovered at that time. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of the District Court and grant 
defense counsel permission to withdraw from the case.  We find that counsel has 
                                              
2
 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 517 provides that “When a defendant has 
been arrested in a court case, with a warrant, outside of the judicial district where the 
warrant of arrest was issued, the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay to 
the proper issuing authority in the judicial district of arrest for the purpose of posting bail, 
as permitted by law.” 
7 
 
adequately shown that there are no nonfrivolous appealable issues and our independent 
review of the record reveals that there are no appealable issues of merit.  In addition, we 
certify that the issues presented lack legal merit and that counsel is not required to file a 
petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.  See Third 
Circuit Local Rule 109.2(b). 
 
 
 
 
